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NONPROFIT OVERSIGHT UNDER SIEGE
INTRODUCTION
DANA BRAKMAN REISER*

Across the globe today, nonprofit regulators are under siege. In a
variety of ways and for myriad reasons, those entrusted with oversight
of charity and civil society are increasingly scrutinized, criticized, marginalized and attacked. The articles that follow this introduction tell
compelling stories of the increasingly grave challenges nonprofit regulators face around the world. Taken together, they offer both lessons
and warnings for those who study and advocate for the nonprofit sector, which cannot thrive without legitimate and effective oversight.
Notably, the roots of this symposium issue lie in another ChicagoKent Law Review symposium on nonprofit law, held in 2004 and published the following year.' That earlier symposium, entitled Who
Guards the Guardians?:Monitoring and Enforcement of Charity Governance, focused its attention on the accountability of charity fiduciaries. It
was held at what in hindsight looks like a high point in government
interest in and critique of nonprofit governance in general and the
performance of charity fiduciaries in particular. Bringing together
scholars from around the globe in the shadow of recently released
Senate Finance Committee staff proposals, the conversation focused on
the meaning of accountability for nonprofit leaders, and how various
legal systems pursued it.
The symposium from which the articles here are drawn was held
at Chicago-Kent College of Law on November 19, 2015, and again
brought together leading domestic and international scholars of nonprofit law. The dialogue in 2015 again included discussion and comparison of the experiences in many diverse countries, but the focus had
shifted dramatically. A decade ago, nonprofit fiduciaries and other
leaders were experiencing the harshest criticisms; today it is nonprofit
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
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regulators who appear in the cross-hairs. Further, the attacks have
become more pointed. Rather than looking for solutions to ensure organizational guardians will be accountable, today's critiques question
the legitimacy of regulators themselves and challenge the very idea of
nonprofit regulation.
Our speakers' presentations elicited many thoughtful questions
and comments, both from their fellow panelists and the lively audience
the symposium attracted. Attendees included additional scholars,
many of whom were attending the simultaneous annual meeting in
Chicago of the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations
and Voluntary Action. We also benefitted from the insights of nonprofit
regulators, attorneys practicing in the area, and leaders of local nonprofit organizations. The articles included in this issue profited greatly
from this discussion, and will allow regulators, advocates and scholars
to see the broader trends into which these often disheartening national
stories fit.
The symposium articles fall broadly into two groups. The initial
three articles address the domestic context, reporting and analyzing
challenges to nonprofit regulators in the U.S. The remaining five articles-(including one to be published in a future volume, but described
here)-look abroad. They share the experiences of nonprofit regulators under scrutiny in a wide range of countries. The first two Parts of
this introduction summarize these contributions. The final Part draws
out the common threads and guidance to be found among these diverse stories, followed by a brief conclusion.
I. CHALLENGES TO NONPROFIT REGULATION IN THE U.S.

The scandal that emerged in 2013 out of IRS review of applications for tax exemption is the starting point for our U.S.-focused articles. Evelyn Brody and Marcus Owens explain the developments
leading up to it and the IRS' dramatic actions since, warning that the
response may be laying the groundwork for new troubles down the
road.2 Recognizing how the scandal hobbled the potential for IRS regulation in the area and the FEC's political stalemate, Linda Sugin considers whether and how state attorneys general might step in to regulate
nonprofits' political activities.3 Finally, Lloyd Mayer's contribution
2. See Evelyn Brody & Marcus Owens, Exile to Main Street: The I.R.S.'s Diminished Role in
Overseeing Tax-Exempt Organizations, 91 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 859 (2016).
3. See Linda Sugin, Politics, Disclosure, and State Law Solutions for 501 (c)(4) Organizations,
91 CHI-KENT L. REv. 895 (2016).S
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takes a step back from this particular turn of events to evaluate the
fragmented American system of nonprofit regulation more generally.4
Before recounting the "sorry saga of the recent unpleasantness"s
at the IRS, Brody and Owens begin by unpacking the arcane and complex framework regulating the advocacy and political activity of taxexempt nonprofits.6 Nonprofits that are tax-exempt under Internal
Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) are barred from all participation in political
campaigns and may engage only in insubstantial lobbying efforts.7 Social welfare organizations exempt under Code § 501(c)(4), by contrast,
may engage in unlimited lobbying activity and may participate in political campaigns so long as such efforts are not their primary activity.8
For organizations that will primarily engage in political campaigns,
exemption is available under Code § 527 as a political action committee.9 Neither contributions to social welfare organizations nor those to
political action committees will generate tax deductions for donors,
however, in distinction to the tax treatment of gifts to § 501(c)(3) charities. Crucially, § 527 organizations must disclose their donors publicly,
while donors to 501(c)(4) groups may remain anonymous.1o When
Citizens United v. FEC cleared a path for corporations, including nonprofit corporations, to make unlimited independent expenditures, applications for 501(c)(4) status increased dramatically.11
The IRS made a critical mistake in dealing with this upsurge in applications by screening applications for more fulsome review by
searching for those organizations with political terms in their names.12
When news of this practice entered the tense and partisan political
climate, strong reactions followed: a Department of Justice investigation, congressional hearings, a media blitz and endless grandstanding.13 The Treasury Department did issue proposed new regulations to
clarify 501(c)(4) status in late 2013.14 But these were met with such
overwhelming dissatisfaction that the government withdrew them,
4. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Fragmented Oversight ofNonprofits in the United States: Does it
Work? Can it Work?, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 937 (2016).
5. Brody & Owens, supra note 2, at 860.
6. See id. at 861-62.
7. See id. at 862.
8. See id. at 863.
9. See id. at 863-64.
10. See id. at 864.
11. See id. at 865.
12. See id. at 865-66.
13. See id. at 866-68.
14. See id. at 868-69.
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and the latest budget deal prohibits any spending on revising them
through September 2016.15
In the meantime, the IRS was purged of its top management, including the entire experienced leadership in the exempt organizations
area.1 6 After reassigning the technical legal staff to the Office of Chief
Counsel, the agency relocated the new leadership of the exempt organizations unit from Washington D.C. to Cincinnati, and put in place a
highly streamlined process for applications for 501(c)(3) status for
small organizations.1 7 The intense scrutiny and criticism the IRS experienced in response to the scandal also caused it to struggle to maintain adequate funding from Congress.18 Brody and Owens recognize
that today's determination process is faster than in years past. They
warn, however, that the response of curtailing the IRS role in nonprofit
regulation creates new opportunities to game the system and skirt the
limitations on exempt activities.19 They advocate incremental reforms
to mitigate these harms, including a more robust evaluation of new
small organizations' applications for exempt status.20
Linda Sugin's article picks up the story here. The aftermath of the
IRS scandal and the perpetual deadlock of the Federal Election Commission leave her with little hope for federal regulation of electoral
dark money funneled through nonprofit organizations.21 Her article
queries whether the states might play a useful gap-filling role.
Sugin begins with the forays by two states into this area: California and New York. California's regulations, promulgated in 2014, require 501(c)(4) organizations spending money on state elections and
ballot measures to report their donors to regulators, and to disclose
their top donors publicly.22 The regulation also takes pains to pierce

through the layers of organizations sometimes employed to obscure
donor identities.23 New York acted twice on these issues. In 2013, new
regulations applying to non-charitable nonprofit organizations required reporting of expenditures on state election activity as well as

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See id. at 869.
See id. at 867-68.
See id. at 874-78.
See id. at 872, 881-82.
See id. at 883-89.
See id. at 889-91.
See Sugin, supra note 3, at 896-903.
See id. at 904-05.
See id. at 905-06.
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disclosure of donor names, which would be posted publicly.24 These
regulations were withdrawn in June 2014, when the state amended its
election legislation.25 The new election law focuses broadly on reporting of election expenditures by a range of organizations, not merely
nonprofits.26 Notably, it requires only that these expenditures and contributor names be reported to state officials; the public disclosure element was lost27

Sugin then identifies the relevant policy goals in combatting dark
money, and considers how they map onto the regulatory prerogatives
of the states. The many and varied policy goals include equalizing political power; to "creat[ing] frictions"28 that make it difficult for out-ofstate groups to influence state elections; fighting voter and donor
fraud; and protecting the reputation of the charitable sector.29 She argues that to craft apt solutions, states will need to tailor their regulatory interventions to their desired set of goals, and warns they must act
carefully to avoid constitutional violations.30
These early case studies illuminate what state involvement has to
offer the regulation of dark money in the U.S. While not a replacement
for nationwide efforts to reduce the role of unaccountable funds in
elections, they may help protect charities from disparagement, and
donors from being led astray. 31 In addition, states may operate as laboratories to generate experience with a variety of approaches from
which national regulation may take useful lessons if the gridlock in
Washington ever clears.32
Lloyd Mayer reminds us that the combination of state and federal
jurisdiction is not unique to regulation of nonprofits' political activities.
Shared power pervades nonprofit law. In the U.S., state law governs the
formation of nonprofit organizations, and states are responsible for
enforcing the obligations of their fiduciaries, ensuring preservation
and appropriate use of charitable assets, and regulating charitable solicitation activity; states also have the power to grant and condition

24. See id. at 907-08.
25. See id. at 909.
26. See id. at 909-10.
27. See id. at 910.
28. Id. at 912.
29. See id. at 911-17.
30. See id. at 918-28.
31. See id. at 928-35.
32. See id. at 931-32.
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state tax benefits.33 Federal tax authorities bestow and police federal
tax benefits, including exemption and eligibility to receive deductible
contributions.34 And over the years, Congress and federal tax regulators have made increasing incursions into regulating nonprofit governance, especially self-dealing by organizational leaders.35
This fragmentation across state and federal authorities also occurs
in many other regulatory contexts, and recent literature suggests that
such multiple regimes offer both advantages and disadvantages.36
Fragmentation creates the risk of duplicative regulation, increased
compliance burdens, races to the bottom and obscuring accountability.37 But, as Sugin's piece argues as well, fragmentation also allows for
beneficial experimentation.38 At the same time, fragmentation can reduce the risk of under-regulation, allow different regulators to develop
complementary expertises, and decrease the likelihood of agency capture, among other benefits.39 Mayer carefully assesses how these benefits and drawbacks balance out in the nonprofit context.40
He concludes that the consequences of fragmented regulation in
the nonprofit space have been primarily on the positive side, particularly as a means to counteract the resource constraints that hamper all
nonprofit regulators.41 Improvements remain possible, though. Mayer
echoes the oft-heard call for improved coordination of state and federal information-gathering.42 He also advocates a provocative proposal
for consolidating financing for nonprofit regulation across all levels of
government.43
II. NONPROFIT OVERSIGHT UNDER SIEGE ABROAD
The next group of papers turns our attention to developments
abroad. Each of these five articles tells the story of a different regulator
or group of regulators operating in a different political environment.
Our contributors explore developments in Europe, Asia, Australia and
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See Mayer, supra note 4, at 939-41.
See id. at 941.
See id. at 941-42.
See id. at 944-46.
See id at 947-48.
See id. at 946-47.
See id.
See id. at 948-59.
See id at 959.
See id. at 960-62.
See id. at 962-63.
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Canada. Yet, a number of strikingly similar themes run between them,
and also relate back to the U.S.-focused articles.
We begin in England and Wales, with Debra Morris' article on the
Charity Commission for England and Wales.44 Long an example to the
world of well-resourced, careful, and effective regulation, the Charity
Commission has recently come under intense scrutiny and pressure,
financial as well as substantive. The focus on the Commission began as
part of required reviews of its performance under the Charities Act of
2006, a major piece of charitable legislation.45 It intensified soon after,
due to a series of perceived Commission missteps. Critics challenged
the Commission's effectiveness on grounds that it did too little to combat the major tax evasion scheme perpetrated through the charitable
Cup Trust and the abuse of charities by terrorist organizations.46 The
Commission's independence and legitimacy was also undermined by
claims it challenged actions by charities with political leanings opposed to policies of the conservative government.47 This long and
widely admired nonprofit regulator found itself in unfamiliar territory.
Morris reports a curious mix of responses to the critiques levied at
the Commission. On the one hand, the Commission experienced a devastating loss of funding reminiscent of the IRS' post-scandal experience; its budget, along with other government functions, has been
slashed by nearly half in less than a decade.48 On the other hand, Parliament has passed new legislation that grants the Commission increased powers and new remedies; it only awaits Royal assent.49 While
the Commission no doubt welcomes greater enhanced enforcement
authority, Morris makes clear it will be difficult for it to make progress
without greater resources.so
One controversial way to bridge this funding gap is self-funding by
the nonprofit sector. The Commission has said it will need to explore
imposing fees on regulated charities, and a survey suggested the general public supports such a move.s1 Charities themselves, however, are
understandably anxious about how such a step will impact both their
44. See Debra Morris, The Charity Commission for England and Wales: A Fine Example or
Another Fine Mess?, 91 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 965 (2016).
45. See id. at 966.
46. See id. at 968-71.
47. See id. at 971-77.
48. See id. at 966.
49. See id at 979-80.
50. See id. at 982-83.
51. See id. at 982-84.
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own financial bottom lines and the independence of the Commission.52
Although she believes it will be some time before the funding question
is resolved, Morris sees signs of progress. She ends her article on the
hopeful note that the Commission is "proving its resilience and soldiering on."ss
Oonagh Breen turns our attention to attempts at regional nonprofit regulation by the European Union.54 She offers two very different
stories. The first details the struggle, and ultimate failure, to adopt European-level foundation legislation. The second describes the complex
relationship between the EU, the nonprofit community, and international efforts to prevent the use of nonprofit organizations in financing
terrorism. Neither is an unqualified success story, but both experiences
teach valuable lessons in regulatory strategy and design.
The effort to develop a European foundation statute began in response to concerns that the lack of uniformity in foundation law introduced unnecessary financial burdens on European nonprofits and
frustrated cross-border philanthropy.5s The lack of a treaty basis for
the EU to regulate nonprofit organizations directly, however, meant
that any such regulation would have to achieve unanimous consent
from all 28 member nations.56 A raft of controversies quickly
emerged.57 The challenge of finding a single statute that would appeal
to and function within the wide variety of legal systems and charitable
cultures in each member state ultimately proved too much.58 The European Foundation Statute was dropped from the legislative agenda,
and the problems it was meant to fix remain unremedied.59
Breen's second case study, of the European Union's engagement
with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on revising its provisions
on nonprofits, moves from hard to soft law. The FATF is an intergovernmental body dedicated to combatting the funding of terrorist
groups.60 As part of its efforts to prevent terrorist entities from abus52. See id. at 984-87.
53. Id. at 988,
54. See Oonagh B. Breen, European Non-profit Oversight: The Case for Regulating from the
Outside In, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 991 (2016).
55. See id. at 996-97.
56. See id. at 993-95.
57. See id. at 998-1002 (describing debates over the definition of "public benefit purpose,"
the tax implications of European foundation status, and even the use of the "foundation" concept
itself).
58. See id.
59. See id. at 1002-03.
60. See id. at 1004.
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ing or inventing nonprofit organizations as conduits for terrorist financing, the FATF issued a series of recommendations and best practices for member governments, including the EU, to follow.61 The

nonprofit sector respects the importance of the FATF's mandate, but
found its early efforts in the nonprofit sphere overly restrictive and, at
times, counterproductive.62
As a regional member of the FATF, the EU is responsible for complying with its recommendations, including those relevant to nonprofits.63 But its early efforts to develop a code of conduct and other
guidance failed-in no small part due to the EU's lack of engagement
with the sector.64 In contrast, the FATF itself began to engage the nonprofit sector with a consultation in 2013.65 This road was not altogether smooth, and in a recent misstep the FATF failed to seek wideranging comments on its March 2015 report. 66 In a striking turna-

round, however, the EU appears to have learned the engagement lesson. The EU Commission leaked the report to nonprofits for their
review.67
Breen is cautiously optimistic that challenges to regulators from
the nonprofit sector itself can result in positive change.68 EU-level direct nonprofit legislation is unlikely to get past the structural impediments that stand in its way. But, collaboratively-developed soft law
may represent an alternative paradigm for better regulation of European nonprofits.69

In his presentation at the live symposium, Mark Sidel explored a
very different set of examples of how governments may regulate the
nonprofit space-frustrating the growth of civil society in disturbing
ways.70 After noting the phenomenon of the narrowing space for civil
society in China and elsewhere, his review tracked developments in
nonprofit regulation across five diverse Asian countries. Many of these
nations are increasing the engagement of national security regulators

61. See id. at 1004-05.
62. See id. at 1005-08.
63. See id. at 1010.
64. See id. at 1010-12.
65. See id. at 1012.
66. See id. at 1012-15.
67. See id. at 1015-16.
68. See id. at 1016-19.
69. See id.at 1019-20.
70. See Mark Sidel, The Reorientationand SecuritizationofNonprofit Oversightin Asia (Univ.
of Wis. Law Sch., Working Paper, 2016).
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in charity oversight, with the goals of tamping down dissent and limiting the role of domestic and foreign organizations and foreign funding.
A few, however, offer bright spots in an otherwise sobering report, and
suggest models for reform.
Sidel first, and most extensively, discussed the situation in China.
Under its system of "differentiated management," China has for decades more intensely regulated domestic advocacy and foreign nonprofits of all stripes than it has domestic social service organizations.71
Authorities perceive the latter posing little threat, while they suspect
the former may be seeding political transformation.72 Official attention
to these particular charities grew following the "color revolutions" of
the early 2000s, and further increased after the Xi Jinping government
took office in 2012. It culminated in 2014 when authority over foreign
NGOs and foundations was proposed to be moved from the Ministry of
Civil Affairs to the more powerful Ministry of Public Security. The Ministry of Public Security quickly drafted a new and highly restrictive law
to regulate foreign nonprofits, usurping the Ministry of Civil Affairs'
authority over one of the most controversial slices of the Chinese nonprofit pie. This swift and clear move to securitize nonprofit regulation
in China generated fierce opposition from the sector at home and
abroad. The ultimate fate of this legislation was unknown until it
passed just before this issue went to print, and delayed publication of
Professor Sidel's article will allow him to explore this new development in greater detail.7 3
Sidel's presentation also compared and contrasted Chinese developments with those in a variety of other Asian nations. Vietnam, also a
one-party state with concerns about outside groups agitating for political change, has taken a more balanced approach. The security service
plays an important role in nonprofit regulation, but does so in collaboration with an intermediary group, the Vietnam Union of Friendship
Organizations, which manages most contact with foreign NGOs.74 Sidel
expressed regret that China declined to follow this example.
71. See, e.g., Mark Sidel, The Shifting Balance of Philanthropic Regulation in China, in
PHILANTHROPY FOR HEALTH IN CHINA (ennifer Ryan et al. eds., 2014) for more information on the
Chinese system of nonprofit regulation.
72. See id.
73. See Edward Wong, Clampdown in China Restricts 7,000 Foreign Organizations, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 28, 2016, at Al.
74. For information on the Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations, see COMINGO, VUFO
and PACCOM, VUFO-NGO RESOURCE CTR., http://www.ngocentre.org.vn/content/comingo-vufoand-paccom (last visited May 25, 2016).
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India provides very different points of comparison. The longstanding and vibrant nonprofit community there has come under increasing
scrutiny, often in the name of counter-terrorist initiatives similar to
those addressed by Professor Breen. Since 2014, this "hardening" of
nonprofit oversight has intensified, with the removal of thousands of
groups from the register of NGOs permitted to receive foreign funds,
challenges to Greenpeace in India, and the freezing of Ford Foundation
funds.75 Greenpeace won relief in court and Ford negotiated for access
to its funds and the capacity to continue making grants, and the trend
in India is not toward full securitization.76 Yet, Sidel reported that formerly passive regulators are being pushed to stronger efforts, particularly since the start of the Modi administration.
Recent changes in Pakistan and Cambodia more closely mirror
those in China. Pakistan shifted nonprofit oversight to more securityminded regulatorS77 and Cambodia adopted new and highly restrictive
nonprofit legislation.78 The many stories Sidel offered combine to
powerfully argue there is a trend toward securitization of nonprofit
regulation in Asia. This trend challenges traditional nonprofit regulation, and undermines the sector's ability to enhance civil society. But it
is not unopposed, and it is the subject of fierce debate in a number of
Asian countries.
Myles McGregor-Lowndes' article recounts the travails of the Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission (ACNC).79 In a shock-

75. See, e.g., Vaishnavi Chandrashekhar, India Crackdown? Ford Foundation Latest Foreign
NGO
Slapped
by
Delhi,
CHRISTIAN
SCi.
MONITOR
(May
4,
2015),
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2015/0504/ndia-crackdown-FordFoundation-latest-foreign-NGO-slapped-by-Delhi; Foreign Funding: Modi Government Cancels
Licences of over 10,000
NGOs,
ECON.
TIMES
(July
22,
2015,
2:21
PM),
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-07-22/news/64725606_1_foreigncontribution-fcra-home-ministry.
76. See Press Release, Greenpeace, Delhi High Court Orders MHA to Allow Access to Greenpeace
India's
Domestic
Accounts
(May
26,
2015),
http://www.greenpeace.org/india/en/Press/Delhi-High-court-orders-MHA-to-allow-access-toGreenpeace-Indias-domestic-accounts/; Bharti Jain, Ford Foundation-govt Stand-off Ends as NGO
Agrees to Come Under Fema, TIMES OF INDIA
(July 16, 2015, 3:23 AM),
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Ford-Foundation-govt-stand-off-ends-as-NGO-agreesto-come-under-Fema/articleshow/48092013.cms.
77. See Pakistan: Withdraw Repressive New NGO Rules, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 6, 2015),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/10/06/pakistan-withdraw-repressive-new-ngo-rules (reporting the shift of authority to the more security minded Ministry of Interior).
78. See MARK SIDEL & DAVID MOORE, INTL CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAw, THE LAW AFFECTING
CIVIL SOCIETY IN ASIA: DEVELOPMENTS & CHALLENGES FOR NONPROFIT & CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

(2015).
79. See Myles McGregor-Lowndes, Australia - 7wo Political Narratives and One Charity
Regulator Caught in the Middle, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1021 (2016).
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ing turnabout fueled by a change of government, the agency was slated
for abolition just two years after its creation. 80 Even more confounding,
as McGregor-Lowndes explains, both sides of the debate defended
their actions as necessary to reduce "red tape" burdens on charities.81
This argument was attractive to conservative voices seeking to diminish government involvement, and also to those seeking reform and
streamlining of charity regulation by moving its nexus from the various
states to the federal level. It was on this basis that in 2010 the Labor
government proposed a scoping study for a one-stop national charity
agency and later introduced the 2012 bill creating the ACNC.82 The
then-opposition argued that the measure would be self-defeating, by
adding to charities' regulatory burdens more generally, and thereby
improvidently expanding government.83 The bill passed over these
objections and the ACNC began operations.
Then, in September 2013, a new coalition government came to
power. Calls were raised to shutter the infant agency in line with coalition's general goal of reducing national-level legislation and government involvement in the economy and the lives of private citizens.84 By
March 2014, a bill had been introduced to repeal the legislation establishing the ACNC.85 The ACNC staff admirably continued work despite
the axe quite precipitously hanging over them, and the agency generated surprising improvements in the short and troubled period after its
inception.86 The Senate passed a motion calling for withdrawal of the
ACNC repeal bill in 2015 and relief finally came early this year, when
the Minister for Social Services announced the Australian Government
would no longer proceed with it.87
McGregor-Lowndes relates this strange tale, but also exposes the
flaw that lies at its heart. Empirical research across many contexts
strongly and uniformly demonstrates that perceptions of red tape burdens are much stronger than their reality.88 In the Australian nonprofit

experience in particular, McGregor-Lowndes and Christine Ryan have
shown that the red tape burdening charities there arises from detailed
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 1021.
id. at 1021-22.
id. at 1028-30.
id. at 1030-3 1.
id at 1037-39.
id. at 1038.
id. at 1034-37
id. at 1043.
id. at 1031-34.
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and repetitive applications for state-level grants.8 9 The ACNC plays no
part in these state grant application processes, so neither creating it as
a national regulator nor removing it from this role would ease the real
red tape burden borne by Australian charities. Perhaps the current
reprieve will allow ACNC to convene the various state authorities
needed to address these and other more trenchant concerns. As
McGregor-Lowndes insightfully concludes, "it is yet to be confirmed
whether this period will be seen by history as [the ACNC's] prolonged
death throes or a baptism by fire from which it emerges with toughened character and resolve."9o
In the symposium's final article, Adam Parachin recounts the story
of a damaging scandal just barely avoided.91 In 2012, the Canada Revenue Agency received earmarked funds in the federal budget to conduct
audits of charities' political advocacy activities.92 This move generated
significant controversy, including claims that the agency was acting for
political purposes and targeting environmental charities.93 When the
October 2015 election replaced the conservative government, priorities in the charity regulation area shifted as well. Justin Trudeau's Liberal administration will not pursue further audits and instead has
pledged to clarify and reform the law relating to charities' political
activity.94 Parachin declines to comment on the merit of the audits or
the allegations of bias they spurred, as details of the audits and their
results have not yet been made public.95 Instead, he asks more abstract
jurisprudential and policy questions. Does the "political purposes" doctrine, which remains a matter of public debate despite the change of
administration, inject corrupting ideals into Canadian charity law?
And, if so, what can be done to limit this effect?
Parachin begins his analysis with the case of McGovern v. Attorney
General, which held that a trust is not charitable if it includes a direct
and principal purpose "to further the interests of a particular political
party" or "to procure changes in the laws" or policies domestically or
abroad.96 He argues that this doctrine has become intertwined with

89. See id at 1032.
90. Id. at 1044-45.
91. See Adam Parachin, Reforming the Regulation of Political Advocacy by Charities: From
Charity UnderSiege to Charity UnderRescue?, 91 CH.-KENT L. REV. 1047 (2016).
92. See id. at 1049.
93. See id. at 1048-49.
94. See id. at 1055.
95. See id. at 1048.
96. Id. at 1057-58.
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three problematic misconceptions about charity law, which reform
efforts should avoid perpetuating. Parachin asserts that charities' political activities should not be policed as a means to rationing tax expenditures. 97 Nor does he believe the standard economic account of
charities as a response to market and government failures sheds much
light on the proper application of the charity/politics distinction.98
Finally, he forcefully argues against grounding the distinction on a
need for neutrality.99
In place of these current (but, in his view, misguided) touchstones,
Parachin proposes three alternatives. As the doctrine is modernized,
courts and regulators would do well to remember the "innovative capacity of charities as thought leaders."100 Charities can make unique
and important contributions to political discourse that should not be
silenced. Further, Parachin argues that the attempt to separate charity
and politics is, on some level, doomed to failure. As his arguments regarding neutrality suggest, charity is always about pursuing some conception of the good-over other, conflicting conceptions. Charitable
appeals will always contain messages that are caught up in this idea of
what is good and valuable.101 Ultimately, Parachin argues that the key
to the charity/politics distinction lies in retaining the space and difference not between charity and politics, but between charity and government.102 It is charity not being government, doing government and
becoming too involved with government, that should be guarded
against. This focus will allow much political advocacy by charities to
survive, as Parachin asserts it should.
III. PARALLELS, LESSONS AND WARNINGS
Despite the diverse national and regional stories these articles tell,
major cross-cutting themes emerge from the symposium as a whole.
These themes generate lessons for those observing the increasing challenges faced by nonprofit regulators around the globe, and for regulators themselves.
The first is institutional competence. In every context studied, the
expertise and resources of nonprofit regulators matters greatly. Mayer
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See id. at 1059-60.
See id. at 1061-62.
See id. at 1062-70.
Id. at 1070.
See id. at 1071-74.
See id. at 1074-77.

2016]

INTRODUCTION

857

takes on these issues at the conceptual level, considering the capacity
of state and federal regulators to achieve the objectives set for them by
state and federal law. Sugin, too, steps back-considering the purposes
of state nonprofit regulation and whether they suit the role of cleaning
up campaign finance.
For many of our other authors, the question is more pragmatic.
Brody and Owens expose the massive change in the work that federal
tax regulators can produce when stripped of financial and human resources in response to a scandal. McGregor-Lowndes recounts the effects of even more dramatic swings in staffing and funding at the ACNC.
Morris warns of a similar dynamic taking hold at the storied Charity
Commission, and Parachin describes its sobering near miss in Canada.
These articles also remind us that even if budgets and headcounts are
not ultimately slashed, the sense of insecurity created by attacks on
regulators saps their capacity to guide and police the sector.
The contributions to this symposium further demonstrate that assets and experience alone will not ensure regulators' effectiveness and
ability to withstand attacks. The larger government context into which
they fit is just as important. Sugin's consideration of a role for states in
regulating dark money responds to the hard truth that federal regulation has become incapacitated. Breen's cautious optimism for soft law
to make gains in regulating the EU nonprofit sector similarly takes on
board the reality that forging unanimity across 28 member states to
enact hard law is nearly impossible. Perhaps most dramatically, Sidel's
review of developments in Asia shows how autocratic regimes can
absorb nonprofit regulation into a security apparatus, massively
changing its orientation and effects on the sector. Where and how nonprofit regulators fit within the larger governmental and political structure of which they are a part will often be determinative.
Relatedly, the second theme running through this set of articles is
the impossibility of placing charity and the politics in neat and mutually exclusive silos. Connections between nonprofits and politics create
serious risks and sometimes inflict grave damage. The IRS scandal that
Brody and Owens and Sugin describe has seriously wounded its nonprofit regulatory arm, causing harm the extent of which may not be
known for years to come. Perceived political bias likewise threatens
the legitimacy of UK regulators. In Australia, McGregor-Lowndes depicts a nonprofit regulator in its infancy caught in a hail of crossfire
over the size of the national government.
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Yet, the articles in this symposium also reveal the enduring connection between charity and politics. Attempts to wall them off from
each other seem inevitably to break down. As Parachin reminds us,
charity is the pursuit of some version of the good. It can never be fully
disconnected from political causes and crises. Nowhere is this deep
connection between the goals of government and the nonprofit sector
more frighteningly obvious than in attempts to quash nonprofit organizations that might shelter dissent in the contemporary China that
Sidel explores. We can try to draw the strands of charity and politics
apart, but they keep coming back together, perhaps unavoidably so.
This symposium helps us to begin considering the tools required to
manage the influence that politics will perennially have on charities
and on charity regulation-to avoid its corruption, capture or incapacitation.
As co-organizers and co-editors of the symposium, Professor Brody and I invite readers to grapple with these themes along with us. We
are certain you will find many other valuable insights in these pages as
well. We thank you for your attention, the authors for their incredible
contributions, and the Chicago-Kent Law Review editors for their dedication and hard work.

